IL Cases of Interest to Emergency Service Providers
Motor vehicle accidents continue to be a source of problems for emergency service personnel. A case decided
in May, 1999, by the Second District Appellate Court can help us understand the rules that Illinois courts will
use to decide when drivers of fire department vehicles will be free from liability in traffic accidents.
In this case, a DuPage County deputy sheriff was on the way to the scene of a death, responding with lights and
siren activated. The deputy entered an intersection, driving against the traffic light and on the wrong side of
the road. The squad car collided with the plaintiff's car, injuring her. The other driver was traveling with the
traffic light, and did not hear or see the deputy's car until both were in the intersection, and a collusion was
unavoidable.
The court was asked to decide if the driver of the other vehicle could recover from the sheriff's deputy and DuPage
County. To reach its decision, the court had to consider the application of two statutes.
One statute is section 11-205 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, which says (in part) that "... the driver of an
authorized emergency vehicle ... when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm may... ‘proceed past
a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be required and necessary for safe operation;
[and may] exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger life or property...." However, the
statute further provides that the statute described above "... do[es] not relieve the driver of an authorized
emergency vehicle from the duty of driving with due regard for the safety of all persons...."
The second statue is the "Tort Immunity Act" (745 ILCS 10/2 and following), which states in part that
" ... a public employee is not liable for his act or omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless
such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct...."
The injured driver asked the court to find a conflict in these two laws, and to hold that the "Tort Immunity
Act" did not apply. The court did not do so, and found that it did not have to choose between the application
of these two laws, but that "... each of the statutes ... stands ‘in its own sphere' and that the immunities
provided by each statute serve different purposes.
Among other things, this case shows how complicated this area of the law can sometimes be, and how important it
is that emergency service agencies have driving policies in place that will, to the greatest extent possible, avoid
motor vehicle accidents.
Carter vs. DuPage County Sheriff, 238 Ill. Dec. 161, 710 NE 2d 1263.
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After a patient treated by fire district EMTs died, an appellate court was asked to determine whether the
fire district should be held liable in his death.
A five member ambulance crew of the Carey Fire Department, including two licensed EMTs, responded to help a patient
in severe respiratory arrest as a result of an asthma attack. When personnel arrived, a family member had already
administered mouth-to- mouth resuscitation on the patient, and the patient had a pulse, was conscious and was breathing
shallowly on his own. Some time prior to transport, the respiratory rate suddenly dropped, and the EMTs "bagged"
the patient in order to force oxygen into his lungs.
En route to the hospital, the EMTs made radio contact with their base hospital, and transmitted information about
the patient's condition to the hospital. Ambulance personnel took the patient's vital signs, started IV therapy,
and used a cardiac monitor to monitor his condition; they assisted ventilation by bagging oxygen.
Despite these actions, the patient went into full cardiopulmonary arrest. The EMTs initiated CPR and asked the
base hospital for orders. The base hospital ordered the EMTs to intubate the patient. Ambulance personnel informed
the hospital that no one on board the ambulance was "certified" to perform intubations, although one
of the EMTS had performed intubations before. The ambulance was stopped to make it easier to intubate the patient,
but the effort was unsuccessful, and the patient vomited. The EMTs suctioned the vomit out of the airway, and administered
additional oxygen. As the ambulance was close to the hospital, the hospital directed the EMTs not to attempt additional
intubation.
The ambulance arrived at the hospital less than a half hour after the fire district received the 911 call. The
patient was admitted to the hospital. He was maintained on life support for approximately a week, and he died as
a result of the asthma attack.
After his death, his widow filed a complaint alleging that the actions of the fire district had caused his death.
She alleged that the fire district was wrong in two different ways. First, she stated that there was wilful and
wanton misconduct by the fire district's EMTs in their treatment of her husband. Specifically, she claimed that
the EMTs (1) failed to property force oxygen into the patient's lungs through the use of a bag or mouth-to-mouth
resuscitation when they first arrived at the scene; (2) failed to promptly contact the base hospital to request
permission to immediately intubate; (3) failed to promptly contact the base hospital to request permission to administer
asthma medications; and (4) failed to properly intubate the patient after being instructed to do so.
Additionally, she alleged that the fire district itself had (1) failed to provide EMTs that were properly trained
and authorized to perform intubations, and (2) failed to obtain intubation training and authorization for its EMTs.
A portion of the EMS Act (210 ILCS 50) makes it clear that a fire district is not liable if treating personnel
are negligent in the care they provide: "Any person, agency or governmental body ...who in good faith provides
life support services ... shall not be civilly or criminally liable as a result of their act or omissions in providing
such services unless such acts or omissions ... are inconsistent with the person's training or constitute willful
or wanton misconduct ...." Thus, there could only be liability if there was not simple negligence, but the
greater degree of wrongdoing that is called "wilful and wanton misconduct".
Regarding the question of "wilful and wanton misconduct" by the ambulance personnel, the court noted
that the fire protection district is a member of the "McHenry/Western Lake County EMS System". The project
medical director for the EMS System has prescribed written SOPs for the EMTs working in the system to follow. The
court found that "... the EMTs conduct was in conformity with the written SOPs governing the treatment of
asthma patients and that the EMTs did not attempt any life support service beyond their level of training...."
The court also stated that "... in light of the extensive care and treatment provided by the EMTs,... we do
not believe that the plaintiff has demonstrated that the EMTs conduct was wilful and wanton..."
On the issue of possible liability of the fire district for failing to provide properly trained personnel, the
court noted that "... the obligation of EMT training and certification does not lie with fire protection districts
but is the responsibility of the Illinois Department of Public Health...." The court here found that the "...EMTs
herein were trained, licensed, and certified as required by Illinois law...."
Bowden vs. Carey Fire Protection District, 237 Ill. Dec. 918, 710 N.E. 2d 548 (April 29, 1999)
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The plaintiff was a 57-year old firefighter for the City of Pekin, Illinois, who had served as a firefighter
for twenty-two years. He applied for a line-of-duty disability pension based on debilitating hypertension and severe
anxiety aggravating the hypertension. He claimed that the disability arose from three significant experiences,
one in 1992, one in 1995, and one in 1996. The Pension Board denied him a line of duty pension. The circuit court
reversed the finding of the Pension Board, and awarded him a pension. The appellate court affirmed the trial court,
so that the firefighter received his pension. The court stated that "... a line-of-duty pension can be awarded
if the plaintiff proves that some condition of his employment exacerbated a preexisting conditon...." Here,
the court found that "... the doctor's testimony is clear that firefighting duties aggravated the plaintiff's
disability...."
Virden vs. Board of Trustees of the Firefighters Pension Fund of the City of Pekin, Illinois, 237 Ill. Dec.
517, 709 N.E. 2d 986 (April 16, 1999).
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In October, 1995, the plaintiff was hired as a firefighter by the City of DeKalb. Less than six months later,
he was arrested for unlawful use of weapons and disorderly conduct. Two days after his arrest, the City terminated
his employment, without explanation. The City failed to conduct any hearing regarding the matter, or to grant plaintiff
any relief. The City relied on the fact that the plaintiff, Ertl, was only a "probationary" firefighter.
However, at the time, the City of DeKalb had a collective bargaining agreement with its employees. While the City
alleged that it was not required to follow the agreement regarding disciplinary actions taken against a probationary
employee, the appellate court disagreed. It found that because the City failed to follow its collective bargaining
agreement in the manner in which it discharged the plaintiff, the plaintiff was entitled to relief. The court ordered,
among other things, that the plaintiff be reinstated as a firefighter, and that he receive whatever damages might
be appropriate as a result of the City's actions in unlawfully discharging him.
Ertl vs. City of DeKalb, 236 Ill. Dec. 988, 708 N.E. 2d 574 (March 18, 1999)